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Introduction
The hybrid war in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine is linked to history, 
geography, demography, local and national power play and international 
level power politics between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and Russia. Russia has strong fraternal ties with Ukraine dating 
back to the 9th century and the founding of Kievan Rus, the first eastern 
Slavic state, whose capital was Kiev/Kyiv. The country has been under 
partial or total Russian rule for most of those intervening centuries, which 
is a big part of why one in six Ukrainians is actually an ethnic Russian, one 
in three speaks Russian as the native language (the other two-thirds speak 
Ukrainian natively), and much of the country’s media is in Russian. It is 
also why the subject of Russia is such a divisive one in Ukraine: many in 
the country see Moscow as the source of Ukraine’s historical subjugation 
and something to be resisted, while others tend to look at Russia more 
fondly, with a sense of shared heritage and history.1 Nikita Khrushchev 
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and the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union transferred Crimea from 
under the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
to the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. 
As both republics were a part of the Soviet Union, the move was largely 
symbolic and of little practical consequence.2 Because of its large Russian 
population, Crimea’s links with Russia have remained very important, and 
Russia’s military on the peninsula represented a bond with Russians on 
the mainland and was perceived to be an important part of the economy. 
The 45 million people of Ukraine have failed to resolve their internal 
divisions and build strong political institutions, hampering the ability to 
implement economic reforms. In the decade following independence, 
successive Presidents allowed oligarchs to gain increasing control over 
the economy while repression against political opponents intensified. 
By 2010, Ukraine’s 50 richest people controlled nearly half of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), writes Andrew Wilson in 
the Council for Foreign Relations’ book Pathways to Freedom.3
At a 2008 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin told US President George Bush, “You don’t understand, George, 
that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories 
is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us.”4 Former US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a Washington Post op-ed.5 
“The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a 
foreign country.” 
The immediate genesis of the hybrid war can be traced to the Maidan 
Protest in November 2013. President Yanukovych (a native of eastern 
Ukraine’s Donets Basins, drawing much of his support from that region’s 
ethnic Russian population), elected in 2010, strengthened ties with 
Russia, extending Russia’s lease on port facilities in the Crimean city of 
Sevastopol to 2042-47, and signed legislation that indefinitely halted 
Ukraine’s progress toward NATO membership.6 In November 2013, 
when Yanukovych announced that he would not proceed with the long-
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anticipated association and trade agreements with the European Union 
(EU), mass protests erupted in Ukraine. After meeting with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin on November 9, Yanukovych instead moved to 
further expand ties with Russia. Thousands of people took to the streets 
in response, and demonstrators established a protest camp in Kiev’s/
Kyiv’s Maidan (Independence Square). Opposition politicians voiced 
their support for the protesters, while Moscow backed the Yanukovych 
administration with promises of low-interest loans and reductions in the 
price of natural gas. In the subsequent months, a series of government 
crackdowns was unsuccessful in suppressing dissent, and in February 2014, 
the Ukrainian security forces opened fire on the Maidan protesters, killing 
scores and wounding hundreds. With his political base disintegrating, 
President Yanukovych released Tymoshenko, a political opponent and ex-
Prime Minister, and scheduled snap Presidential elections for May 2014.7 
On February 22, three months after his reversal regarding the association 
agreement, the protesters got their wish as Parliament voted to “remove 
Viktor Yanukovych from the post of President of Ukraine.”8 
President Viktor Yanukovych was replaced by a pro-Western interim 
government. The fear that a pro-Western government at Kiev/Kyiv could 
tilt and align with the EU and NATO, probably convinced Russia to plan 
the annexation as the protests intensified. In the months leading up to 
the decision, Russia launched a hybrid campaign which included covert 
operations, information warfare, and, eventually, a conventional invasion 
to take control of the Crimean peninsula. Simultaneously, from March 
2014, it conducted a separatist campaign in the eastern Ukrainian regions 
of Donetsk and Luhansk with a mix of political warfare, the support of 
paramilitary groups, and conventional forces.9 
Given its geography as a peninsula, Crimea was easy to seal from the 
mainland and simple to defend from a counter-attack. Russia was also 
easily able to sever communications between Crimea and the mainland. 
Crimea was a well-defined administrative entity, with its own polity and 
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history, including some degree of political autonomy, allowing it to be 
neatly separated from Ukraine as an annexed territory. Crimea was closest 
to Russia’s Southern Military District, which had the highest state of 
readiness among the Russian forces, manned at 90 per cent, according 
to some estimates.10 Circumstances conspired against Ukraine because 
the Southern Military District was already on high readiness, given that 
Russia was hosting the Olympic Games in Sochi in February and March 
2014. Finally, Crimea’s small size relative to Ukraine (the largest country 
in Europe) made the Russian annexation much more feasible.11 
Russia had transit agreements with Ukraine that allowed it to 
deploy personnel and material to Crimea before and during the military 
operation. The terms of Russia’s basing agreement with Ukraine offered 
substantial leeway for transfer of units from the mainland, if needed; there 
was a sizeable troop limit in the basing agreement, which gave Russia the 
capacity to increase its military presence while still being within the terms 
of its deal with Ukraine. Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel 
in the Black Sea Fleet in February 2014, the only infantry unit of which 
was the 810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade. The Russian Naval 
Infantry was staffed by contract troops, who were better trained, paid, and 
equipped than typical conscript units. In terms of numbers and available 
firepower, these forces were inferior to Ukraine’s units in Crimea, lacking 
infantry fighting vehicles, armour, or artillery.12 
Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was a leading and supporting 
asset for the operation, with anti-air and anti-naval capabilities. The naval 
base at Sevastopol allowed Russian military units to deploy early in the 
operation and provided the logistics for inserting Special Forces and 
reinforcements. This permitted Russia to insert Special Forces without 
initially causing alarm and introduce the necessary capabilities to conduct 
the operation. It also had a transit agreement through Ukraine for its 
forces in Transnistria (Moldova), although Kyiv/Kiev had unilaterally 
cancelled this deal on May 21, 2015.13
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In February, Ukraine’s interim Defence Minister assessed this number 
as closer to 15,000 troops, but considered approximately 1,500–2,000 
troops as dependable and willing to obey if ordered to fight the Russian 
military. A contingent of 2,500 Ministry of Interior troops was also 
present, but had little defence value. The military force included 41 tanks, 
160 infantry fighting vehicles, 47 artillery systems, and heavy mortars. 
The Navy’s coastal defence troops included a missile artillery brigade, two 
independent marine battalions, and a coastal defence brigade. Of the 45 
MiG-29 fighters at Belbek air base near Sevastopol in southwest Crimea, 
only four to six were operational. The Ukrainian air defences included 
the Buk-M1 and S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, which were at 
questionable readiness levels but could still be potent deterrents.14 
Post February 22, 2014, Ukraine’s political leadership made 
three mistakes which also helped Russia’s cause. First, the Ukrainian 
Parliament, the Rada, on February 23, repealed the legislation that 
had given the Russian language official status and protection. The 
interim President, Oleksandr Turchynov, did not agree to sign the 
changed law, but great damage had been done. The Russian-speaking 
public judged it as an anti-Russian agenda.15 Second, the next day, on 
February 24, Igor Mosiichuk, a leader of the Right Sector, a far-right 
political party and paramilitary group in Ukraine, without government 
support, publicly threatened to bring paramilitary fighters to Crimea. 
The Russian-language media used Mosiichuk’s statements to convey a 
sense of imminent danger for those living in Crimea. Crimean Berkut 
riot-police officers, reinforced with Kuban Cossacks, who reside in parts 
of Russia near the Black Sea, set up checkpoints under the guise of 
responding to a potential right-wing threat. Clashes between Crimean 
Tatars and Russian nationalists, protests for secession from Ukraine, and 
counter-protests for unity ensued, leading to a general state of chaos and 
disorganisation and facilitating Russia’s takeover. This validated the need 
for Russian help in Crimea and the legitimacy of Russia’s intervention 
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to its domestic audience.16 Third, on February 25, Ukraine’s Minister 
of Interior disbanded the Crimean Berkut riot police returning to 
Sevastopol after suppressing protests in Kyiv/Kiev. Upon their return to 
Sevastopol, these units were greeted as heroes by the people and issued 
Russian passports by Moscow. They defected to the Russian side and 
provided auxiliary units in the early operations, when Russia was short 
on manpower. Some participated in further operations in paramilitary 
units, which left Crimea for the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine to 
fight on behalf of the Russian government.17 
Ukraine’s government was in transition following the ouster of 
Yanukovych. Russia’s task was made relatively easy by the confusion and 
chaos that generally follows an uprising, such as what happened in Kyiv/ 
Kiev. It is not clear whether any action would have been successful, as 
Ukraine’s head of intelligence services [SluzhbaBezpekyUkrayiny (SBU)] 
reported during a decisive meeting that the military and security forces 
were demoralised and not receptive to the interim government. 
Ukrainian and Russian units went on alert on February 20, 2014, 
as the Maidan protests in Kyiv escalated into violent clashes with the 
government security forces and on February 22, 2014, the Ukrainian 
Rada removed President Yanukovych from power. Russian operations 
in Crimea effectively began on February 22 and 23, as battalions of 
the Spetsnaz (elite infantry) units and Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska 
(Airborne Forces or VDV) left their bases, while others were airlifted 
close to the strait separating Russia from Crimea. On February 24, 
the city council in Sevastopol installed a Russian citizen as Mayor, and 
several units from the 810th Naval Infantry arrived in the city square in 
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). This was the first tangible sign that 
Russia had decided to intervene militarily to change the political order 
on the peninsula. On February 25, the Nikolai Filchenkov, an Alligator-
class landing ship, carrying 200 Russian Special Operations Forces [likely 
the Special Operations Command, Russia (KSO)], arrived in Sevastopol, 
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in addition to bringing Special Operations Forces units that would 
subsequently be used in the covert takeover of Crimea.18 
On February 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a snap 
inspection involving 150,000 troops from parts of the Western and 
Central Military Districts. A drill of this scale was not unusual. The new 
Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, had been frequently ordering large 
snap readiness checks and simultaneous drills since 2013. Ostensibly, the 
exercise was not focussed on Ukraine’s borders but to move VDV and 
Spetsnaz troops northward in Russia. Roughly, 40 Ilyushin Il-76 military 
transports left the Ulyanovsk air base in Russia, with a large portion 
of these units moving to Anapa, a staging area just east of Crimea. On 
February 27, 50 Special Forces operators from the KSO unit pretending 
to be a local “self-defence militia” seized the Crimean Parliament and 
raised a Russian flag over the building.19 Another large landing ship, with 
300 Russian soldiers, arrived, following proper border procedures to 
enter Ukraine but without advance notice to the Ukrainian authorities, 
as stipulated in the agreements. Later that night, Russian soldiers without 
markings surrounded the Belbek air base. On the morning of February 
28, a convoy of three Mi-8 transport helicopters and eight Mi-35M 
attack helicopters crossed into Ukraine without permission, giving Russia 
the ability to neutralise Ukrainian armour and operate at night. Ukraine 
scrambled fighters, deterring further helicopter units from transferring, 
but the Mi-35s already were operating openly over Crimea and supporting 
the Russian forces on the ground.
On March 1, President Putin requested Parliamentary approval to 
use troops in Ukraine to protect the Black Sea Fleet and ethnic Russians 
who faced “real threats to [their] life and health”. In sum, the Russian 
movements of late February 2014 effectively boxed in the Ukraine forces, 
even though the Russian capabilities were limited to one incomplete 
naval infantry brigade and several hundred Special Forces operatives. On 
February 28, the Russian forces also seized Simferopol airport, cancelled 
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all flights, and began airlifting VDV units into Crimea. Still at a distinct 
numerical disadvantage, on March 1-2, Russia brought reinforcements 
by heavy landing ships. These units spread across the peninsula without 
much resistance, quickly encircling or taking over bases and military 
facilities. Armed with light utility vehicles and APCs, the Russian units 
had little firepower but high mobility.20 
Ukraine saw its docked fleet blockaded by Russian ships; the 
Commander of its Navy, Denis Berezovsky, defected to Russia. The 
Russian forces made ad hoc arrangements with the trapped Ukrainian 
troops at bases across the peninsula to maintain the siege without violence. 
The Russian troops applied heavy psychological pressure, propaganda, 
and promises to the Ukrainian Commanders to get them to defect, with 
little success until after the annexation in March.
From March 6, Russia began a conventional troop build-up over the 
Kerch ferry crossing in eastern Crimea, bringing in units from motor rifle 
brigades, towed artillery, a variety of air defence units, and anti-ship missile 
batteries. The Russian military also began to mass units on Ukraine’s 
eastern border as a threat and diversion. The Russian forces sealed Crimea 
off from mainland Ukraine at its northern crossing points. They severed 
landline communications between the Ukrainian mainland and bases on 
Crimea; in some areas, cell phone signals were jammed, possibly from 
ship-based equipment. The Russian soldiers also cut electricity to some 
bases to apply pressure on the besieged Ukrainian troops within. In brief, 
Ukraine had lost effective command and control over its units on the 
peninsula roughly one week into the operation. Russian intelligence also 
used this time to organise self-defence units consisting of local militia, 
Cossacks (a distinct cultural group of East Slavic people common to 
the region), and the former special police called the Berkut. Russian 
airborne troops also donned police uniforms to help keep order among 
the population under the pretence of being local security forces. Russia 
used non-military and paramilitary elements to confuse the battle 
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space. Russian Special Forces were critical, but other elements were also 
deployed to give the impression of local support. Volunteers included 
Army veterans, boxers, and members of the biker gang “Night Wolves.”21 
Russia annexed Ukraine with no direct Russian casualties. From March 19 
to March 25, the Russian forces seized Ukrainian bases in Crimea, most 
of which offered no resistance. Moscow promised to honour the rank 
of, and provide better pay and benefits to, all Crimea-based Ukrainian 
soldiers who defected and accepted Russian citizenship. Most did so, in 
large part because they were stationed near their families and homes on 
the peninsula. Ukraine’s Defence Minister was subsequently forced to 
resign, announcing that out of 18,000 soldiers and families, only 6,500 
chose to leave for Ukraine proper. Even among those who left, such as the 
10th Naval Aviation Brigade, some soldiers later resigned and returned 
to Crimea. By March 26, the annexation was essentially complete, and 
Russia began returning seized military hardware to Ukraine.22
The Crimean Parliament initially declared a referendum on 
independence for May 25, and then moved it to March 30, before finally 
deciding on March 6 to hold the vote on March 16. The political process 
to hold a referendum was organised; there were two votes: one to leave 
Ukraine, which was necessary for Crimea to become an independent 
polity, and the second, a referendum to accede to the Russian Federation. 
The March 16 referendum would become the political instrument to 
annex the peninsula, a process that concluded on March 18. 
While the Russian troops were conducting operations in Crimea, 
the Kremlin also launched an information campaign targeted at the 
Russian public and Crimean residents. During the seizure of Crimea, the 
information campaign had three objectives. The first was to discredit the 
new government in Ukraine, which was often referred to as a “fascist 
junta.” Russia also sought to highlight the danger faced by ethnic 
Russians in Ukraine. Finally, the Kremlin emphasised the broad support 
for Crimea’s return to Russia.
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The Russian media had always covered events in Crimea for its own 
domestic public, but this intensified as the clashes between the pro-
government forces and the protesters in Kyiv grew more violent. The 
media was also addressed, smaller players exited the scene and existing 
government outlets, such as RIA Novosti and Voice of Russia, were 
consolidated into Russia Today, now known as RT. In the period before the 
Crimean campaign, most of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea watched Russian 
television, and the overwhelming majority of the population received their 
news from televised media. Ukraine had largely ceded Russian-language 
information to Russian-based outlets, particularly in Crimea—information 
and entertainment from these channels were dominant among the 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The Russian forces turned off nine Ukrainian 
television channels on March 9, leaving access to Russian channels only. 
Channels from Ukraine remained accessible via satellite receivers.
On February 26, Russia began promoting its message that the regime 
change in Ukraine was illegal. This was one day prior to the takeover of 
government buildings in Crimea. This message was advanced by several 
Russian figures and elites contending that Russians were under threat in 
Crimea and required protection and that Russia needed to act to secure 
their safety. The message was straightforward: “[N]ationalists and fascists 
took power in Kyiv/Kiev, they will force Russians to abandon the Russian 
language, and present a general threat”.23
A movement called Stop Maidan emerged in Simferopol. Russia 
apparently also took advantage of a grassroots movement running in 
opposition to Euromaidan. Stop Maidan’s rallying cry was centered on pro-
Russian statements such as “Crimea for stability”, “no to extremism”, and 
“no to foreign interference!” The movement used thousands of billboards 
and visible advertisements to amplify its message, which largely aligned with 
Russia’s information campaign. Though the Stop Maidan protesters denied 
any ties to Moscow, varying degrees of connection have been alleged. In 
general, Russia’s information warfare “aims at affecting the consciousness 
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of the masses, both at home and abroad, and conditioning them for the 
civilizational struggle between Russia’s Eurasian culture and the West.” The 
themes of Russia’s strategic communication on Crimea pertained to the 
Ukrainian government and the role of the Western countries. These included 
the following: The Crimean land historically belonged to Russia. The 
transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was a historical mistake of the Soviet 
period. Ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population in Crimea 
were under an imminent ultra-nationalist threat. Russia was not involved 
in the events in Crimea. The March 16 referendum on independence was 
legitimate, demonstrating the will of the people of Crimea. The Ukrainian 
soldiers voluntarily gave up their weapons and declared their allegiance to 
Russia. The Ukrainian government acts in the interests of the United States 
and other foreign powers. The Maidan movement was overrun by (violent) 
ultra-nationalists, and Ukraine’s President overthrown in an illegitimate coup 
d’état, backed by the West. The pro-European population of Ukraine are 
the ideological descendants of Nazi supporters and fascists, and the Western 
countries, and especially the United States, were core orchestrators of the 
events in the Ukraine. The primary US motivation was the expansion of 
NATO and containment of Russia. The United States has been pressuring 
Europe to impose sanctions against Russia and is the driving force of a policy 
of containment against Moscow. The Russian policy is not a departure from 
previous Western interventions to change borders and create new political 
entities, such as in Kosovo.24
The Russian operations in Crimea represented, by all accounts, an 
efficient seizure of territory from another state, executed with speed and 
competence. The Ukrainian security services initially were unable to resist 
the attacks. With tens of thousands of Russian troops massed just across 
the border and the memory of the 2008 conflict between Russia and 
Georgia fresh in their minds, the leaders in Kiev were forced to weigh any 
possible military response against the likelihood of triggering an overt 
Russian intervention. 
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Hybrid operations become easier if the opposing force is perceived 
to be friendly and legitimate. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was historically 
based in Crimea; therefore, much of the population viewed its personnel 
as a friendly force. Crimea was distinct in that militaries belonging to 
two different states were based there. Both were viewed as legitimate by 
the population, their presence historically considered valid. Furthermore, 
the Crimeans had fewer economic reasons to fear, or protest against, 
annexation, as incomes, salaries, and pensions were substantially higher in 
Russia than in Ukraine. According to the World Bank, the gross domestic 
product per capita in Ukraine in 2014 was US$ 3,082.50, compared 
with US$ 12,735.90 in Russia. The history, identity, and economic links 
of Crimea to Russia were structural factors, reducing the likelihood of 
popular resistance and contributing to the ease of Russia’s operation. 
Cultural proximity between the Russian and Crimea Russian troops and 
intelligence operatives, and the shared language, culture, and ethnicity of 
most Crimeans, gave the Russians advantages as an invading force. The 
Russian agents were able to blend readily among the Crimeans to organise 
or coordinate self-defence units. Paratroopers could pretend to be police 
or interior troops and conduct riot control against protesters. In short, 
the common language and culture allowed the Russian forces to rapidly 
insert themselves into the operating environment and take control of the 
peninsula. Furthermore, the Russian military could readily communicate 
with the sympathetic elements of the population to facilitate the takeover.
In Eastern Ukraine, Moscow initially encouraged an anti-government 
movement. It launched a political warfare campaign rather than sending 
Special Forces as a precursor to a conventional invasion. The objective was 
to destabilise southeastern Ukraine in order to increase control over the 
region, and if possible, convince the local authorities to accept a federal 
scheme. The Kremlin used a diverse network of political operatives, 
businessmen, criminal elements, and powerful oligarchs to oppose 
Ukraine’s new government. The Ukrainian government inadvertently 
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escalated the conflict by arresting the protest leaders and sparking a 
separatist insurgency. The escalation continued as the protest movement 
turned to irregular warfare and Russia began conventional reinforcements 
with its own troops in support of the separatists.25 
Protests in Eastern Ukraine against the new Ukrainian government 
that began almost immediately after the Maidan protests, prompted 
Yanukovych’s flight from power. As stated earlier, the new government in 
Ukraine made three mistakes, which aided the separatists and Russians. 
The reaction to these moves, coupled with Russia’s operation in Crimea, 
encouraged the mobilisation of both leftist and right-wing organisations 
in Eastern Ukraine, and their leaders, previously existing on the margins 
of Ukrainian political life, proclaimed themselves as “People’s Mayors” 
and “People’s Governors.”26 The opening events of the political turmoil 
in Eastern Ukraine closely followed the pattern of Crimea with the 
appointment of Russian citizens as Mayors/Governors in the cities of 
Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Slovyansk. The protesters’ actions were 
spontaneous and self-initiated, driven by public anxiety about the future 
after the victory of the Maidan movement in the capital. The public 
agitation and outcry appeared genuine and not disconnected from the 
country’s political divisions. It is possible that some Russian citizens 
crossed the border to participate in these events of their own accord, but 
most protestors were local Ukrainians.27 Most of the people in Eastern 
Ukraine had voted for Yanukovych and traditionally supported his 
political party, the Party of the Regions. They were upset by his removal 
and uncertain about Ukraine’s political direction.28 
The protesters seized the regional administration buildings in Kharkiv 
and Donetsk on March 1, took over the regional administration building 
in Luhansk on March 9, and demanded that a referendum be held on 
annexing the Luhansk Oblast (region) to Russia. The protesters’ official 
causes included a referendum on federalisation, recognition of Russian 
as the second official state language, and a Customs Union with Russia. 
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The call for a referendum was apparently a bid to pressurise the Ukrainian 
government for devolution of more autonomy to the region. These 
individuals could be described as pro-Russian and certainly anti-Maidan 
oriented, but they were also obscure figures of little-to-no political 
significance in the country or the region, and could be characterised as 
local and regional political outsiders, adherents of extreme movements 
who exist on the margins of the political landscape. 
The Ukrainian regional law enforcement cracked down on these 
People’s Governors and, by removing them, inadvertently paved the 
way for a different set of leaders to take over the movement. By March 
10, the local police managed to regain control of all the captured 
administration buildings in the three cities. Street clashes between 
pro- and anti-Maidan protesters continued for several days in the 
major cities. Meanwhile, the interim Ukrainian government appointed 
oligarchs as new Governors, assuming they would use their patronage 
networks to retain control and defend their own economic interests. 
The new appointees had ties with the Russian security services, military 
experience, and associations with business interests in Russia. Many 
were either local to the Donbas region or came from Crimea, likely 
at the behest of Russian intelligence in early March. The new leaders 
were more interested in mounting direct action and had the military 
experience to command a paramilitary force.
This change in leadership marked the true beginning of the separatist 
movement and the transition from political warfare to insurgency. Rather 
than wait to hold a referendum on the status of the regions, Commanders, 
such as Strelkov and his comrade Igor Bezler stormed the buildings of the 
local administration and proclaimed the territories under their control as 
republics. His actions prevented a restoration of order by the Ukrainian 
authorities, as occurred in Odessa and Kharkiv, where crackdowns 
ended the protests and the local elites chose to side with the national 
government. When Strelkov declared the Donetsk Republic (DNR), he 
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shifted the cause from federalisation to outright secession from Ukraine, 
which was always his personal intention. 
From April 6 to 23, the separatists employed groups of armed 
men to capture and hold the administration buildings that were lost by 
the pro-Russian civilian demonstrators in early March. The separatists 
seized the main administrative building in Donetsk on April 6, overran 
an Interior Ministry rapid-response force at the Luhansk administration 
complex on April 11, and took the city halls in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, 
and Krasny Liman on April 12. In Donetsk, the separatists seized the 
state security services building to gain access to 300 assault rifles and 
400 handguns, enabling them to arm the fighters and further spread 
the insurgency. At this stage of the movement, the demands vacillated 
between autonomy within a federalised Ukraine and secession in order 
to join Russia. The proclamation by Strelkov of the DNR on April 7 
marked a more concerted attempt to unify effort and command among 
the separatists behind a political structure. Pro-Russian separatists would 
declare a Luhansk People’s Republic a few weeks later. Eventually, 
Strelkov took overall command and control of a large conglomeration of 
fighters called the South-East Army, becoming the leading political figure 
of the separatist movement. Although he was able to attract members of 
some pro-Russian organisations, including the East Front and Donbas 
People’s Movement, Strelkov was unable to monopolise the use of force 
in the area. The local elites, who formed their own battalions, preferred to 
maintain their autonomy. Units such as the Vostok Battalion in Donetsk, 
headed by a former Commander of the Ukrainian Alfa Special Forces in 
the region, and Zarya in Luhansk, primarily comprising local residents, 
acted independently of Strelkov’s South-East Army. 
From April 15 to 23, Ukrainian Army and Interior Ministry forces 
mounted efforts to respond to the separatists. Most of the deployed units 
in the east were halted outside the captured cities by a handful of crude 
checkpoints and several pro-Russian civilian mobs. Russian citizens took 
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command of the separatist movement in mid-April, and they had Russian 
volunteers with them. The Ukrainian security forces were ineffective for 
two reasons. First, the Ukrainian Army existed largely on paper, with 
perhaps only 6,000 combat-capable troops available. Second, the Ukrainian 
Army Commanders spoke Russian and were disinclined to fight against 
fellow Russian speakers or order troops into civilian areas. The Ukrainian 
military was completely unprepared for the launch of combat operations. 
The local police in Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk were 
either intimidated by the separatists or defected to them. The Ukrainian 
soldiers and their Commanders were confused by the situation on the 
ground and did not know how to deal with the separatist forces that 
were accompanied by supportive civilian mobs. Many Ukrainian units 
retreated by April 23, and in one case, six Ukrainian airborne vehicles 
were captured by the separatists and local civilians without a fight. This 
handful of fighting vehicles and a self-propelled mortar were used by the 
separatists from April until June, when heavier conventional equipment 
was eventually supplied directly by Russia. 
From late April to late May, the Ukrainian Army mounted a more 
deliberate campaign to contain the pro-Russian rebellion by securing key 
terrain around Donbas cities held by the separatists. The Anti-Terrorist 
Operation (the Ukrainian government’s official name for its campaign 
against the separatists) was essentially a siege-warfare campaign, leveraging 
Ukraine’s vastly superior numbers, artillery, and air power to steadily 
encircle and push out the separatists from fortified terrain. The objective 
of this strategy was to position the military for a decisive offensive against 
the rebel enclave, once Ukraine’s national mobilisation, including the 
May 1 reintroduction of mass conscription for men had been completed. 
After taking the outlying cities, Ukraine’s Army planned to isolate and 
besiege Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Meanwhile, the separatists obtained short-range air-defence weaponry, 
presumably from Russia or possibly from stocks in Ukraine. In late April 
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and May, several Ukrainian military helicopters and fixed wing transport 
aircraft were shot down in the Donbas region. Russia apparently supplied 
the rebels with shoulder-fired and self-propelled Strela-10M short-range 
systems. The Russian forces massing on Ukraine’s borders grew beyond 
40,000, diverting Ukraine’s deployments to its borders, defending cities 
such as Kharkiv, rather than to the conflict zone, because of the threat 
of a large-scale invasion. In the last week of April, the Ukrainian Army 
made probing attacks against the outskirts of Slovyansk. On May 2, a 
Ukrainian offensive made gains, seizing part of the city, with casualties on 
both sides and at the cost of two helicopters. In the subsequent weeks, 
fighting spread to other towns in Donetsk, with see-saw battles between 
government forces and the separatists in Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and 
Mariupol. 
Separatist leaders organised a referendum on May 11, without any 
discernible legal basis, in which 89 per cent of participants supposedly 
voted in favour of self-rule. Violence continued until the May 25, 
Presidential election, with several attacks by the separatist forces possibly 
aiming to disrupt the election. Ukraine’s Presidential election was held on 
May 25, and Petro Poroshenko defeated the former Prime Minister, Yulia 
Tymoshenko. The next day, the first battle for Donetsk airport began. 
Over two days, Ukrainian forces fought separatist militants, who suffered 
heavy losses. Pro-Russian rebels said that more than 50 of their soldiers 
were killed. The Ukrainian Army was able to push the separatists out of 
Donetsk’s international terminal with air strikes and a paratrooper assault. 
The battle was also the first of the conflict involving a “large group of 
volunteers from Russia who arrived to reinforce the separatists.”29 Ramzan 
Kadyrov, Chechnya’s President, allegedly ordered the fighters from the 
“dikayadiviziya,” or “savage division” to Ukraine. The first battle for 
Donetsk airport was also a turning point in that more Russian soldiers 
arrived to reinforce the separatists, but it proved a military disaster for the 
separatist fighters. Scores were killed at the airport and on the way back to 
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the city by friendly fire from the Vostok Battalion, which confused them 
for Ukrainian units, due to lack of communication among the disparate 
separatist forces. 
The May 26 battle for Donetsk airport likely marked a departure point 
for the greater involvement of ‘volunteers’ from Russia to bolster the 
separatist ranks. The battle for Donetsk airport and Ukraine’s subsequent 
offensive operations escalated the conflict vertically for Russia, resulting 
in the steady transition to conventional warfare. From June to August, 
the Kremlin supplied the separatists with mechanised equipment, armour, 
advanced munitions, and medium air defences. The strong air defence was 
effective; Ukraine’s Air Force suffered so many losses that it was incapable 
of contributing in the conflict by mid-August. On July 17, Russian-
backed militia fired a surface-to-air missile at Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, 
killing 283 passengers and 15 crew members, drawing increased global 
attention to the conflict. 
Ukraine’s forces were, however, still able to make some gains against 
the separatists. On July 5, the government recaptured several towns held 
by the separatists, including Slovyansk. As the fighting continued, the pro-
Russian militants were pushed back into their strongholds of Donetsk and 
Luhansk after sustaining heavy losses. By early August, the government 
had recaptured about 75 per cent of territory previously held by the 
separatists. At this point, the rebels’ outlook was dire. The Ukrainian 
forces had retaken much of the separatists’ territory and were close to 
regaining border control and encircling them entirely. The republics of 
Donetsk and Luhansk were in danger of being split, as Ukrainian soldiers 
drove a wedge between them. Russia’s strategy was failing, forcing 
Moscow to up the ante by launching a conventional invasion in August 
of 2014. Between August 14 and 24, armoured personnel carriers and 
other Russian military vehicles entered Ukraine. Russia continued to deny 
any involvement, despite at least 1,000 Russian soldiers supporting, the 
separatists at the time. Other figures place the number of Russian troops 
balraj singh nagal
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019 53
moved into Ukraine at the time at 4,000. Russia continued to deny its 
involvement, but finally admitted to the presence of military personnel 
after Ukrainian troops captured 10 Russian paratroopers. The Kremlin 
claimed they had crossed the border accidentally. By the end of August, 
the separatists had resumed pressure on the Luhansk and Donetsk airports, 
and threatened Mariupol again. On August 24, Russia abandoned an 
effort to mix in conventional weaponry, such as tanks and air defence, 
in support of the separatist forces. Instead, it switched to conventional 
operations, invading with perhaps 4,000 regular troops (accurate figures 
are unavailable) and defeating Ukraine’s military at the Battle of Ilovaisk. 
On September 5, in Minsk, Belarus, negotiators arranged a ceasefire 
between the Ukrainian and separatist forces, referred to as the Minsk I. 
Two days later, Russian-backed separatists seized Donetsk airport.
Although artillery skirmishes continued, both sides took a break to 
rearm, train, and consolidate between September 5, 2014, and January 
13, 2015. In January 2015, Russia launched a second offensive, and 
following a second encirclement and defeat at Debaltseve, Ukraine signed 
the Minsk II ceasefire on February 12, 2015, on terms highly favourable 
for Moscow.
The Ukraine intervention displayed the range of tools at Moscow’s 
disposal – from information and cyber war, though the use of proxies, 
to direct use of own forces. Proxies were a prominent feature as Russia 
supported an array of groups with pro-Russian agendas. In the early phases 
of the conflict, it sought to foment the rebels and assisted with ‘volunteer’ 
recruitment in support of the separatists. Russia relied on a range of actors 
with existing networks to influence Ukraine. Separatist soldiers were drawn 
from Russia and other post-Soviet states, tied together by nationalism. 
The Kremlin also employed a variety of paramilitaries. Organisations 
such as former members of the Chechen “Vostok Battalion,” the Russian 
Orthodox Army, Night Wolves, Cossack paramilitaries, and Chetnik 
Guards operated in Ukraine and Crimea. The Wolves’ Head Battalion, a 
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Cossack paramilitary that fought in Georgia in 2008, operated in Ukraine 
in lieu of Russian troops. Russia’s information campaign was aimed at both 
the West and Ukraine, tuning the messaging for the intended audience. 
The Kremlin accused the West of meddling in Ukrainian and Russian 
affairs, while claiming Russia as a defender of democracy in Ukraine. It 
also claimed to act according to the people’s wishes. Beyond justifying its 
involvement in eastern Ukraine, Russia threatened military action while 
insisting it wanted peace. Russia also denied its involvement in Ukraine 
while constantly reminding listeners about its military and even nuclear 
superiority as warnings. Domestic messaging focussed on NATO’s threat 
and the West’s plotting. Russia questioned the legitimacy of the government 
in Kiev, labelling it “fascist” and “Nazi”. 
In Ukraine and Russia, the concept of Novorossiya became a key 
aspect of the information campaign. Novorossiya, meaning “New Russia”, 
was chanted by pro-Russian protesters and even mentioned by Putin. The 
term appealed to Russian nationalists seeking to return to a golden age 
of the Russian empire. It was also used as a historical justification for the 
separatists’ actions. Novorossiya was used by the Donetsk and Luhansk 
republics when they created the confederation of Novorossiya and United 
Armed Forces of Novorossiya in May 2014. Beyond targeted messaging 
and propaganda, Russia also used cyber attacks as part of its information 
campaign. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks targeted the 
pro-Maidan movement and Ukrainian government. The country was 
subjected to at least five cyber espionage attacks between 2013 and 2017. 
Attacks also targeted Ukraine’s election system, delaying the results in 
October of 2014.
The new media facilitated the familiar tactics, and Russia was able 
to leverage the social media effectively during the conflict. Pro-Maidan 
pages on the two largest social-media platforms in Ukraine, VKontakte 
and Odnoklassniki, were blocked, as they were hosted on Russian servers. 
The two services were also useful in recruiting for the separatists’ cause. 
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The messages played to a Ukrainian vulnerability, for Ukraine’s security 
forces’ lack of capability was amplified by a lack of will to fight. Defections 
were common. Russia’s tactic of bribing and intimidating soldiers was 
designed to coerce them into defections. The Ukrainian soldiers were 
subjected to a barrage of spam messages: “Your battalion commander 
has retreated. Take care of yourself;” “You will not regain Donbas back. 
Further bloodshed is pointless”; “Ukrainian soldier, it’s better to retreat 
alive than stay here and die”.30 The tactic was effective; members of 
Ukraine’s 25th paratrooper division from Dnipropetrovsk gave up their 
vehicles to the pro-Russian separatists. The Ukrainian soldiers were not 
well equipped, paid, or fed, and were asked to fight against their “own 
people.” Throughout the intervention, Russia put political and economic 
pressure on Ukraine. Russia’s political campaign began before the military 
operations. On December 17, 2013, Putin offered Yanukovych (still the 
Ukrainian President at the time) a lifeline amid the instability, taking 
advantage of Ukraine’s financial vulnerabilities. The lifeline was in the 
form of a US$ 15 billion bailout and significant discounts on natural gas 
imports. Not only was the agreement an attempt to draw Ukraine back 
into Russia’s orbit, it fed into the Kremlin’s information operations by 
suggesting that closer ties to Russia would result in economic prosperity, 
while, in contrast, closer ties with the EU would compel Ukraine to address 
debt issues with austerity programmes unattractive to the Ukrainians.
Today, the separatist force continues to undergo consolidation and 
conversion into a conventional Army, equipped by Russia and supported 
by a capable contingent of Russian troops who serve as a quick reaction 
force. The conflict intensity is cyclical, largely quiet in the fall of 2015, 
with a ceasefire, then experiencing a strong uptick in artillery skirmishes 
and fighting in the winter and spring of 2016. Russia has achieved some 
of its political objectives in Ukraine and will lock in further gains if the 
Ukrainian leaders implement the political concessions they accepted 
under the Minsk II Accord.
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Russia orchestrated a secession movement in the eastern regions 
as leverage to force Ukraine into accepting federalisation. It had ample 
military opportunity to invade Ukraine, defeat its forces, and conquer any 
eastern region if it so chose. In fact, even after having considerable time 
to organise, arm, and prepare, Ukraine was soundly defeated in August 
2014 and February 2015 at the battles of Illovaisk and Debaltseve. 
Russia’s intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine involved a wide 
range of tools and methods to achieve its aims, and the success resulted 
from simultaneous application these of tools and methods, aided by 
historical connections between Russia and the regions. The information 
and political warfare, coupled with language and economic links were vital 
to the local support. The earlier deployment of troops in Crimea made 
the takeover seamless and bloodless; the effortless induction of additional 
troops was aided by the existing agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
Conclusion
Russia’s intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine with the use of a wide 
range of tools and methods to achieve its aims, attained success by the 
simultaneous application of the tools and methods aided by the historical 
connections between Russia and the regions. The Russians were helped 
of the confusion and chaos in the Ukranian polity following the removal 
of the President by the Parliament; in addition, three decisions by the 
Rada became catalysts for the Russian population in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine to welcome the Russian intervention. The fears, apprehensions 
and expectations of the Russian population in these areas comprised the 
key to the success of the intervention: not only did they support it but also 
participated as separatists and military fighters. Information and political 
warfare, coupled with language and economic links were vital to the local 
support. The information war preyed on the anxieties of the Russian 
population in Ukraine and Russia about the expansion of NATO towards 
the Russian sphere of influence. Russia’s control over TV networks and 
balraj singh nagal
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019 57
high Russian content aided its cause. Better economic prospects with 
Russia compared to Ukraine convinced the local Russian population to 
move away and support the Russian intervention. The poor training and 
fighting capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces were substantial reasons 
for the loss of territory; the shifting of loyalty by some troops in the 
Crimea based on local affiliations and base locations added to the inability 
to resist. The existing deployment of troops in Crimea made the takeover 
seamless and bloodless; the effortless induction of additional troops was 
aided by the existing agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Russian 
military assistance was a major factor in the success of the separatists, 
and the Russian troops’ actions in the battles of Illovaisk and Debaltseve 
sealed the fate of the region. The Russian actions in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine do not comprise truly classic hybrid war but are only a part of 
it, however, there is a need to learn lessons from the intervention. The 
West and NATO promised but did not deliver, and finally contributed 
to generating concerns and alarms in Russia. The Ukrainian polity and 
armed forces miscalculated and took wrong decisions and actions which 
contributed immensely to their defeat.
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